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INTRODUCTION
Since 2005, the Reverend Fred Phelps and other members of the Westboro
Baptist Church have outraged almost everyone by protesting near military
funerals.1 In Snyder v. Phelps the Supreme Court will finally decide whether
that outrage is actionable.2 Few people will lose sleep if the Court finds that the
First Amendment allows Albert Snyder to sue the Phelpses for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy for protesting near his

Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
†
Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I am
indebted to Heidi Kitrosser, Lyrissa Lidsky, Caroline Malla Corbin, Jen Robbennolt, Charles
Smith, Jesse Frogge, Slone Isselhard, and the participants at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Law
& Society Association, where I presented an earlier version of this Essay. Thanks also to Gina
Harrison, Heath Hooper and Dave Winters for their research assistance. I coauthored and
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Scholars of First Amendment Law in Support of Respondent Phelps, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09751 (U.S. July 14, 2010).
1. Lizette Alvarez, Outrage At Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2006, at A14 (quoting Indiana Representative Steve Buyer describing Phelps’ behavior as
“repugnant, outrageous, [and] despicable”). Others refer to the Phelpses as “pieces of garbage”
and “evil.” Geoff Oldfather, A Good Way to Handle Westboro Protestors: Ignore Them, FORT
PIERCE TRIB. (Fla.), May 22, 2008, at B6; Michael Bearak, Westboro Baptist Church Is Evil,
DIGITAL J., Apr. 11, 2010, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/290434.
2. 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09751).
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son’s funeral.3 After all, their messages, including statements such as “Semper
Fi Fags,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “America is Doomed,” “God Hates
the USA,” “God Hates You,” and “Pope in Hell”4 were objectionable and
mean-spirited. Snyder must have viewed their speech as “an affront of the most
egregious kind.”5
This case, however, has the potential to undo decades of the Court’s
jurisprudence protecting offensive speech. Nothing about Snyder suggests the
Phelpses disrupted the funeral.6 Rather, Snyder and his supporters wish to
restrict the Phelpses’ speech because they find it abhorrent and inappropriate.
But the Court’s free speech jurisprudence does not allow governmentsanctioned punishment of speech solely because others find the message
offensive.7 It allows regulation of speech only if the speech contains objective
indicia of harm, such as speech accompanied by physical or aural invasions,
threats, or violence.8 These requirements exist for good reason. Absent
objective indicia of harm, regulation of offensive speech amounts to contentbased censorship and “effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections.”9
Psychological research on emotions validates the Court’s approach by
revealing that anger—the emotion most likely involved with speech we find
offensive—is inextricably linked to censorship. Put simply, individuals get
angry when others demean their personal or social identities.10 Speech that
criticizes or ridicules another’s deeply held personal beliefs or values
exemplifies such an offense. The resulting anger often leads to responsive
action, including the desire to punish the offensive speech.11 Individual
perceptions of what amounts to a demeaning offense vary greatly, however,
depending on particular worldviews, internalized cultural norms, and personal
experiences and beliefs.12 Thus, reactions to speech are the result of a
complicated interplay between the content of speech and an individual’s
subjective emotions.
The Court’s requirement of external indicia of harm, such as imminent
violence, intuitively recognizes and protects against our subjective and
unpredictable emotional responses to speech. Absent an external constraint,
3. Mr. Snyder sued Fred Phelps and several others, including Mr. Phelps’s daughters,
Shirley Phelps-Roper and Rebekah Phelps-Davis. See id. at 211–12.
4. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008).
5. Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151, 153 (2008).
6. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212 (noting that the Phelpses maintained a distance of several
hundred feet from the funeral and were not noisy or disruptive).
7. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
8. See infra Part III.
9. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
10. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION 217, 222 (1991).
11. Id. at 226.
12. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 892 (2009).
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allowing anger or outrage to guide regulation of speech leads to suppression of
speech simply because the content offends a listener’s world view.
Unfortunately, the arguments made in favor of tort liability in Snyder
effectively bypass such external indicia by asking the Court to allow tort
liability based on little more than the Phelpses’ offensive messages.13 Such an
approach is especially dangerous in the context of civil liability. Unlike
generally applicable criminal laws that clearly notify people of behavior that is
out-of-bounds, tort lawsuits involve individual disputes between discrete
parties. Without a requirement that the speech contain external indicia of harm,
anyone can bring a claim that another’s speech inflicts emotional distress
because such speech offends their world view. Holding the Phelpses liable thus
allows censorship of speech based upon its unpopular message. Given that the
potential bases for tort liability are endless, such an approach threatens to
remove contentious speech from public discussion.
Part I of this Essay discusses the history of Snyder. Part II examines the
Court’s doctrines pertaining to offensive speech, reviewing its longstanding
jurisprudence protecting offensive messages and explaining why the Phelpses’
speech in Snyder fits within this doctrine. Part III then examines certain
exceptions to the Court’s protection of speech—the captive audience and low
value speech doctrines—and explains why attempts to analogize between these
doctrines and the tort liability in Snyder fall short. Finally, Part IV discusses the
psychology of emotions, focusing primarily on how anger arises. Relying on
these psychological findings, Part IV explains why Snyder’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and invasion of privacy claims cannot fit
within the existing free speech structure. The Essay concludes that the Court
should not recognize a claim for IIED based on offensive messages like those
involved in Snyder, as such liability risks undermining decades of the Court’s
free speech jurisprudence and chilling protected speech.
I
SNYDER V. PHELPS BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
The Phelpses started protesting at the funerals of slain Iraqi and Afghan
war veterans in 2005 to spread their belief that those wars were the ultimate
result of America’s willingness to embrace homosexuality.14 Lawmakers have
reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the protests, with the federal government
and over forty states enacting laws regulating their expression.15
13. See infra note 55 and Part III.B.
14. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–72 (D. Md. 2008) (describing the Phelpses’
view that “God hates homosexuality and hates and punishes America for its tolerance of
homosexuality, particularly in the United States military”); Wells, supra note 5, at 160 & n.44.
15. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Wells, supra note 5, at
161–74.
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Snyder, however, involves a civil suit stemming from the Phelpses’
protest near the funeral of Snyder’s son, Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder.
After issuing a press release and notifying local police about their intent to
picket the funeral, seven members of Phelps’s congregation, the Westboro
Baptist Church, protested at Matthew Snyder’s funeral with signs bearing
messages similar or identical to those described above.16 The protestors were
not noisy, did not block access to the funeral, and obeyed all official directives
to remain at least several hundred feet from the ceremony.17 Although Snyder
was aware of the Phelpses’ presence nearby, he did not see their signs until
after the funeral when he viewed a news broadcast in his home.18
The Phelpses also posted an Internet “epic” on their website mentioning
Snyder and his son.19 The Phelpses’ online post claimed that the Snyders
“raised [their son] for the devil, . . . [and] taught [him] to defy his Creator, to
divorce and to commit adultery . . . [and] to support the largest pedophile
machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity.”20
Snyder also did not view this post until days later when he ran a Google search
about his son’s funeral on the Internet.21 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the
Phelpses’ expression, Snyder experienced severe emotional distress, becoming
tearful and angry upon recalling their actions and suffering physical effects
such as vomiting and an exacerbation of his diabetes.22
B. The Lawsuit
Snyder sued the Phelpses for IIED and invasion of privacy by intrusion
upon seclusion in 2007.23 Although the district court cautioned the jury against
suppressing merely offensive speech, it also noted that free speech interests
“must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its residents from
wrongful injury.”24 According to the court, the Phelpses could be liable for
speech directed at Snyder if their “actions would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, . . . were extreme and outrageous and . . . were so offensive
and shocking as to not be entitled to First Amendment protection.”25 The jury
returned a verdict of $10.9 million against the Phelpses.26 The district court
judge denied the Phelpses’ post-trial motions based on the First Amendment,
ruling that the protestors’ expression created an “atmosphere of confrontation”
16. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 211–12.
17. See id. at 212.
18. Id.
19. Id. (describing the “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder”).
20. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. May 24, 2010); Snyder
v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2009).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 213; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 8.
23. The court dismissed Snyder’s defamation and publicity given to private life claims.
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212–13.
24. Id. at 214–15.
25. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 3113–14).
26. Id. at 211.
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that invoked the rights of mourners to “avoid being verbally assaulted by
outrageous speech and comment during a time of bereavement.”27
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the First Amendment protected
the Phelpses’ speech. Although recognizing that the expression profoundly
distressed Snyder, the appellate court ruled that tort liability was inappropriate
when speech “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an
individual.”28 The court concluded that the Phelpses’ speech could not
reasonably be read to imply an assertion about the Snyders, and even if it could,
the speech expressed “subjective opinion” and “hyperbolic rhetoric intended to
spark [public] debate.”29 According to the Fourth Circuit, the First Amendment
provides “breathing space for [such] contentious speech,” even when it
involves “exaggeration, . . . vilification of men . . . [and] the probability of
excesses and abuses.”30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 2010.31
II
OFFENSIVE SPEECH IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Court has long recognized that expression can “sti[r] people to
anger,” “strike at prejudices and preconceptions,” and have “profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.”32 Nevertheless, the
Court has consistently found that the government may not curtail speech
“simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audience.”33
The Court protects offensive speech for two reasons. First, speech on matters of
public concern retains its value even when delivered in an offensive manner.34
Second, attempts to punish offensive speech too often lead to censorship of
unpopular ideas.35
Snyder implicates the Court’s offensive speech jurisprudence in its purest
sense. The Phelpses’ expression was disrespectful, even contemptible, but, as
the Fourth Circuit found, it falls squarely within the realm of public discourse.36
27. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577, 579 (D. Md. 2008).
28. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20
(1990)).
29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. at 226 (quotations omitted).
31. 130 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751).
32. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
33. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
34. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society
depends on free discussion . . . . [A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute.”).
35. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (Indiscriminate punishment of offensive speech “effectively
empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”).
36. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2009).
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The Phelpses’ signs and Internet epic expressed their opinions on the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars, the validity of the Catholic faith, and gay rights.37 Such
topics are of considerable contemporaneous interest to the public.38 That speech
also conveys beliefs the Phelpses sincerely hold. As one court noted:
[The Phelpses] have long expressed their religious views by . . .
picket[ing] . . . various . . . public events that they view as promoting
homosexuality, idolatry, and other sin. . . . [T]hey have also picketed
near funerals of gay persons, persons who died from AIDS, people
whose lifestyles they believe to be sinful but who are touted as heroic
upon their death, and people whose actions while alive had supported
homosexuality and other activities they consider proud sin. . . . [The
Phelpses] believe that one of the great sins of America is idolatry in
the form of worshiping the human instead of God and that, in America,
this has taken the form of intense worship of the dead, particularly
soldiers. . . .39
Although the Phelpses’ speech is well outside mainstream thought, the Court’s
doctrine maintains such expression is part of public discourse. As the Court
noted, “[m]ost of what we say to one another lacks religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious
value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.”40
Furthermore, the negative public reaction to the Phelpses’ speech, and
arguments favoring imposing tort liability on the family, suggests a strong risk
of censorship of their speech. Unlike neutral laws regulating the time, place,
and manner of any protests near funerals, a lawsuit seeking imposition of
damages targets particular individuals or groups and is far more likely a
response to the protestors’ offensive messages.41 Typically, the Court would
find this to be reason alone to eschew regulation: “[T]hat society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the
speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according
it constitutional protection.”42

37. See supra notes 4 & 20.
38. Media outlets regularly address these issues. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, 12 NATO
Soldiers, 7 From U.S., Are Killed in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A11; Christopher
Hitchens,
Bring
the
Pope
to
Justice,
NEWSWEEK,
Apr.
23,
2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/22/bring-the-pope-to-justice.html; Peter Moskos, Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell: Farewell to My Father’s Idea, WASH. POST, June 4, 2010, at A17; Maura Dolan, Gay
Rights
Groups
Lose
a
Round,
L.A.
TIMES,
July
17,
2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/17/local/me-gaymarriage17.
39. Phelps-Roper v. Bruning, No. 4:10CV3131, 2010 WL 2723202, at *1 (D. Neb. July 6,
2010).
40. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (citation omitted) (original
emphasis).
41. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2000) (discussing how broadly applicable neutral statutes
better protect against censorship compared to restrictions applicable to particular individuals).
42. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 322 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–24 (1971).
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Those arguing for tort liability in Snyder, however, claim that the
Phelpses’ speech falls within exceptions to the Court’s First Amendment
protection. Specifically, they (1) argue that the Court’s captive audience
doctrine allows regulation of offensive speech that invades the listener’s
privacy, and (2) analogize liability for IIED and invasion of privacy to the
Court’s other areas of low value speech, such as libel or fighting words. As
discussed below, tort liability based solely on offensive messages would
require substantial extension of the Court’s jurisprudence.
III
EXCEPTIONS TO FREE SPEECH PROTECTION
A. Invasion of Privacy and the Captive Audience
The Court’s captive audience doctrine allows regulation of speech that
unreasonably invades the privacy interests of listeners. This aspect of the
Court’s jurisprudence is most clearly associated with the home, where privacy
protection is at its apex.43 For example, the Court upheld content-based
regulations controlling indecent broadcasts and mailings into the home.44 In
Frisby v. Schultz, it also upheld content-neutral regulations of “targeted”
picketing aimed at a single residence, recognizing that such picketing
“inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy” because “the home
becomes something less than the home.”45
When the listener is in a public space, however, the Court is far less
willing to recognize a captive audience. It rejected the notion that individuals
have a “generalized right to be left alone on a public street or sidewalk.”46
Rather, it requires that speech physically or aurally invade a zone of privacy
before invoking the captive audience doctrine. Thus, the Court upheld claims
based on aural intrusions by noisy protestors around medical clinics and
schools, as well as physical intrusions from protestors who approached
audience members so closely as to cause invasions of personal space.47
Notably, however, the Court rejected attempts to invoke a captive audience
rationale based solely on the offensiveness of the speaker’s message.48 Indeed,
43. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
44. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
45. 487 U.S. at 486 (citation omitted).
46. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (citation omitted). For
elaboration of this argument, see Wells, supra note 5, at 200–12, 228–30.
47. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994) (upholding restriction
on noisy protests around medical clinic); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972)
(upholding restriction on noisy and disruptive protests around schools); Schenck, 519 U.S. 357,
384–85 (upholding injunction restricting protestors based on previous harassing and intimidating
conduct); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 n.25 (2000) (upholding eight foot no-approach zone
to prevent unwanted physical approaches of individuals at close range).
48. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773 (refusing to uphold an injunction banning “images
observable” by persons within medical clinics because the only “plausible reason” such signs
disturbed patients was that they “found the expression contained in such images disagreeable”).
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the Court routinely states that in public, “the burden normally falls upon . . .
viewer[s] to avoid further bombardment of . . . [their] sensibilities simply by
averting . . . [their] eyes.”49 The fundamental tenet of the captive audience
doctrine is that an individual in public can claim an invasion of privacy only
when he or she encounters a physical or aural intrusion and cannot avoid that
intrusion by moving or looking away.
Supporters of tort liability, however, argue that mourners at a funeral have
a privacy interest “at least as significant as the privacy interes[t] at stake in
one’s home.”50 Accordingly, they liken the Phelpses’ protests to the
“inherently” intrusive residential picketing in Frisby.51 Although friends and
family surely have a privacy interest in mourning their loved ones free from
disruption,52 the analogy to Frisby falls apart when one examines the
“inherently” intrusive rationale. Frisby validated the regulation of targeted
picketing because a picketer (even a solitary, quiet vigil) focusing on one’s
residence day after day was akin to harassment.53 That concept of intrusion had
nothing to do with the content of the speech but, rather, with the erosion of the
home as a place of solitude. In fact, the Court made clear that one could protest
in the neighborhood as long as he or she did not solely target a particular
residence.54
In contrast, finding the Phelpses’ speech intrusive in Snyder requires the
Court to embrace the notion that peaceful protestors who stood several hundred
feet away from the funeral somehow intruded upon it. Absent a physical or
aural invasion, that concept of intrusion must rest solely on the offensiveness of
the protestors’ message.55 In effect, the invasion of privacy claim in Snyder
49. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (quoting
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
50. Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. June 1, 2010); see also
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 53.
51. Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note 50, at 13–17; Brief for Petitioner, supra note
20, at 52–53. State officials defending funeral protest laws make similar arguments. Wells, supra
note 5, at 214–17.
52. Wells, supra note 5, at 228.
53. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1988) (finding that “[t]he devastating effect of
targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt”).
54. Id. at 482–84.
55. Several amicus briefs openly seek regulation of the content of the Phelpses’ message.
E.g., Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note 50, at 15 (describing the Phelpses’ signs as
“personal and vicious attacks, fully intended to target the mourners”); Brief for the Veterans of
Foreign Wars of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10, Snyder v.
Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. June 1, 2010) (stating that the “First Amendment does not require the
grieving family to endure offensive speech of a personally abusive nature”). Snyder, however,
argues that the Phelpses’ mere presence at the funeral violated his privacy at a time when he was
mourning and emotionally vulnerable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 8–9. But this
argument is grounded in the content of the Phelpses’ speech. There is nothing inherently offensive
about peaceful, nondisruptive protests near a funeral; protests occurred in association with
funerals well before the Phelpses’ activities. See, e.g., JOYCE L. KORNBLUH, REBEL VOICES: AN
IWW ANTHOLOGY 200 (1964) (discussing the 1913 funeral/protest of two workers killed by
private detectives); Violent Protests Erupt After Funeral, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2000, at
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rests on the notion that one can be captive to non-invasive but offensive
messages expressed from a distance. This assertion is a significant extension of
the Court’s existing doctrine and threatens speakers with content-based
censorship.
B. Low Value Speech
The Court has carefully crafted its low value speech doctrines to identify
narrow categories of speech capable of restriction.56 Although its methodology
is not always clear, the Court recently noted that it does not find speech
unprotected “on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.”57 Rather, the
structure of its low value speech categories reveals that the Court carefully
limits regulation to prevent punishment of speech based solely on its offensive
content.58 The Court finds speech unprotected only when it does not contribute
to the exchange of ideas as evidenced by external indicia of harm resulting
from speech or from actions that are independently harmful, such as threats or
lies.59 For example, the Court recognizes that government can punish advocacy
of unlawful action only if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and . . . [is] likely to incite or produce such action.”60 The Court
also has permitted officials to punish fighting words only if they “have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually” they
are addressed.61 And the Court’s libel jurisprudence requires plaintiffs to show
that a defamatory statement causes actual harm to their reputation in order to
recover damages.62 The Court designed these low value speech categories to
preserve the “adequate breathing space” necessary for full exercise of First
Amendment freedoms63 and to prevent punishment of speech based solely on
A4 (discussing protest involving 3,000 marchers following funeral of man shot by police).
Furthermore, Snyder welcomed protestors with a supportive message. See Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Cert. at 6–7, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010) (describing the
well-received “picketing” of school children and the Patriot Guard Riders at the Snyder funeral).
Thus, the Phelpses’ speech is “inappropriate” only because of their disrespectful and hurtful
message.
56. Those categories include incitement of illegal action, fighting words, defamation, fraud,
true threats, obscenity, child pornography, and speech integral to criminal conduct. See United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010).
57. Id. at 1586.
58. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949).
59. Daniel Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 933 (2009) (“[T]he large majority of proscribed speech adds
little or nothing to public discourse . . . partly because the [Court’s] ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement
. . . [forces] the state to focus on speech that has little function except to threaten the government’s
compelling interest [such as preventing violence or preserving individual reputation].”).
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
61. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (refusing to allow presumed or
punitive damages absent a finding that defendant acted with “knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth”).
63. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); see also Bose Corp. v.
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its “emotive impact.”64
The IIED and invasion of privacy standards Snyder and others advocate
do not incorporate these external indicia of harm and, thus, fit poorly within the
Court’s low value speech categories. Snyder urges imposition of IIED liability,
for example, based upon the common law elements of that tort.65 However,
those elements—intent, extreme and outrageous conduct, and severe emotional
harm66—are inconsistent with First Amendment protections. They do not
prevent imposition of liability simply because the listener finds the expression
at issue offensive or outrageous.
In fact, the Court in Hustler v. Falwell already recognized that the
common law standards for IIED do not sufficiently protect free speech values.67
Falwell found that IIED’s “outrageousness” standard was so subjective as to
“run[] afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the
audience.”68 The Court also noted that the intent requirement did not protect
public debate because the “speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in
court that he spoke out of hatred.”69 Even speakers who act out of malice or ill
will, the Court found, can contribute to public debate.70 Accordingly, Falwell
required that public figures suing for IIED show a false statement of fact made
with actual malice in order to recover damages. Falwell effectively recognized
that the IIED tort fits uncomfortably within the Court’s low value speech
framework and required an external indicia of harm when speech is the basis of
the tort. Although Falwell’s holding is limited to public figures, the Court’s
reasoning is applicable to the tort regardless of the subject of a suit—a false
statement of fact made with actual malice is necessary to prevent censorship of
any speech related to public concern, not just speech related to public figures.
The broad invasion of privacy argument embraced by Snyder and others
faces similar problems. The common law elements of invasion of privacy
typically involve (1) an unauthorized intrusion, (2) into a secluded space or
one’s private affairs, (3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.71 These
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (describing Court review as
designed “to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits
in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited”).
64. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quotation omitted); see also Falwell, 485
U.S. at 55.
65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 21–41 (arguing against the imposition of First
Amendment standards in Snyder’s IIED case).
66. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986).
67. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. Falwell involved common law standards nearly identical to
Maryland’s standards. Id. at 50 n.3.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id. at 53 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
70. Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (defining the intrusion upon
seclusion form of invasion of privacy as “intentionally intrud[ing], physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . [when] the intrusion would be highly
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elements protect against punishment of speech based on its emotional impact
by recognizing only physical, spatial, or aural intrusions into a secluded area.72
Snyder and others, however, urge the Court to find an invasion of privacy
because they find the Phelpses’ message abhorrent, an argument that divorces
the notion of “intrusion” from the physical, spatial, or aural invasion required at
common law. Their argument conflates the first element of the tort, an
intrusion, with the third element, that the intrusion be offensive to a reasonable
person, and urges that the Phelpses’ speech is intrusive because it offends a
reasonable person. As with imposition of tort liability for IIED, that approach
lacks an external indicium of harm and allows punishment of the “emotive
impact of speech.”73
IV
EMOTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Several observers argue that this emotional impact is precisely the reason
why Snyder should recover damages. They claim, for example, that the First
Amendment should not protect “the use of words as weapons” and argue
allowing tort liability for highly offensive speech will not interfere with robust
“public discourse.”74 Supporters of Snyder contend that compelling private
persons to show anything beyond the common law requirements leaves them
“helpless against malicious speakers,” unlike public figures who must endure
insults and humiliation.75 Few people doubt the power of words to inflict
emotional wounds. Snyder exemplifies this. But psychological research on
emotion reveals the Court’s wisdom in refusing to allow regulation of speech
based on its emotive impact.
A. The Psychology of Anger
Contrary to conventional and legal wisdom, which often treat emotion as

offensive to a reasonable person”).
72. See, e.g., Schulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P. 2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998)
(“[P]laintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy
surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the
plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation or data source.”); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 5:89 (2d. ed. 2010) (Intrusion usually “involves some physical, not merely
psychological, incursion into one’s privacy,” including invasion of space around a person via
surveillance or stalking.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. B (1977) (Intrusion
requires physical intrusion into a place of plaintiff’s seclusion or “by the use of the defendant’s
senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”).
73. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quotation omitted).
74. Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort
Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 336 (2010); see also Chelsea Brown, Not Your
Mother’s Remedy: A Civil Action Response to the Westboro Baptist Church’s Military Funeral
Demonstrations, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 232 (2009); Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note
50, at 23–24, 33–34.
75. Shulman, supra note 74, at 336.
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irrational and fleeting, emotions “are determined, in large part, by beliefs.”76
They are the primary mechanism by which humans understand and respond to
their environment.77 Accordingly, “people’s emotions arise from their
perceptions of their circumstances—immediate, imagined, or remembered.”78
Emotions thus have a strong cognitive component. The circumstances of a
given situation, as well as how a person appraises those circumstances,
determine whether a person experiences a particular emotion. For instance,
psychologists believe that emotions occur according to “core relational themes”
and particular appraisals result in particular emotions.79 As Terry Mahoney
explains, core relational themes “are a ‘psychobiological principle’ captured as
an ‘if-then’ formulation: if a person appraises his or her relationship to the
environment in a particular way then a specific emotion always follows.”80 An
individual will experience the emotion “anger,” for example, when they
perceive that another person engaged in a demeaning offense against him or
her.81
Not everyone, however, perceives the same action as demeaning.82
Rather, a variety of environmental and personality factors affect whether
people respond to an offense with a particular emotion as well as the intensity
of their response. Thus, an individual’s personal goals, values, and beliefs
affect his or her emotional response.83 If people perceive an offending actor to
interfere with those goals, values, and beliefs—especially intentionally and in a
manner that could have been avoided—they will likely respond with anger,
even outrage.84 People’s appraisals that an offender’s behavior violates social
76. Maroney, supra note 12, at 891. Conventional legal wisdom often treats emotion as
unpredictable and visceral. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A
Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997).
77. Maroney, supra note 12, at 874; see also Craig A. Smith & Richard S. Lazarus,
Emotion and Adaptation, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 609, 611
(Lawrence A. Pervin ed., 1990).
78. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes in Emotion, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 572, 572 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003).
79. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 81–82; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Craig A. Smith, From
Appraisal to Emotion: Differences Among Unpleasant Feelings, 12 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION
271, 272 (1988); Matthias Siemer et al., Same Situation—Different Emotions: How Appraisals
Shape Our Emotions, 7 EMOTION 592, 598 (2007).
80. Maroney, supra note 12, at 892.
81. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 222; Paul Ekman, Antecedent Events and Emotion
Metaphors, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 146, 147 (P. Ekman & R.
Davidson eds., 1994).
82. Smith & Lazarus, supra note 77, at 616 (“Appraisals are strongly influenced by
personality variables. Two individuals can construe their situations quite similarly (agree on all
the facts) and yet react with very different emotions, because they have appraised the adaptational
significance of those facts differently.”).
83. Id. at 625.
84. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 222–23; GERALD CLORE, ANDREW ORTNEY & ALLAN
COLLINS, THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS 146–54 (1988); see also Gerald L. Clore &
Karen Gasper, Feeling Is Believing: Some Affective Influences on Belief, in EMOTIONS AND
BELIEFS: HOW FEELINGS INFLUENCE THOUGHTS 10, 30 (Nico H. Frijda et al. eds., 2000); Siemer
et al., supra note 79, at 595.
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norms may also lead to or exacerbate this anger.85 Perceived disrespectful
treatment is an especially common trigger of anger.86
People also tend toward particular actions when experiencing particular
emotions. Thus, those who experience anger tend to express a greater
willingness to attack the offending individual.87 Sometimes this attack comes in
the form of violence.88 At other times, especially when anger results from a
perceived injustice, an attack can occur through formalized mechanisms,
including filing civil lawsuits.89
B. Emotion, Tort Liability and Snyder
This psychological research reveals the problematic nature of the civil
claims in Snyder. They are not problematic because emotions such as anger are
inherently bad or because emotion has no role in First Amendment doctrine.
Indeed, the Court has recognized the important relationship between emotion
and expression.90 But the manner in which emotion plays a role in Snyder has
the potential to undermine the very framework of the Court’s jurisprudence and
generally destabilize its protection of offensive and unpopular speech.
Outrageous action is the core element of IIED. When actions, such as
having sexual relations with the spouse of one’s client,91 are the basis for tort
liability, this element is less problematic. But when one seeks damages based
upon “outrageous” speech that otherwise contributes to public discourse, IIED
lawsuits become tools of censorship. One does not sue under those
circumstances unless the content of the speech reflects beliefs that interfere
with one’s own. Limiting liability to the most outrageous speech will not curb
such lawsuits. The more that people are outraged, the more certain they become
of the validity of their beliefs and the invalidity of conflicting beliefs.92
Outrageous speech merely reinforces the plaintiff’s belief that he or she was
wronged by the defendant’s message, especially if it is disrespectful.
85. Smith & Lazarus, supra note 77, at 627; Ellsworth & Scherer, supra note 78, at 581.
86. Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
527, 533 (2001).
87. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 226; see Ellsworth & Smith, supra note 79, at 296.
88. See, e.g., Dov Cohen et al., Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An
“Experimental Ethnography,” 70 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 945 (1996) (studying insults to honor
among Southern and Northern males, and linking propensity for hostile reaction to insults to
whether one had grown up in Southern “honor” culture).
89. Miller, supra note 86, at 544 (noting that desire for retribution is a motivator for
lawsuits and that disrespectful treatment can increase people’s willingness to avail themselves of
formal avenues of redress); see also Ellsworth & Smith, supra note 79, at 301 (noting that angry
people might seek less aggressive, more socially acceptable means of retaliation if they are
influenced by other factors).
90. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (noting that “words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force”).
91. Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 77 (1991) (upholding IIED claim against
psychologist who had sexual relations with patient’s wife).
92. Clore & Gasper, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that “emotional feeling can then increase
certainty or commitment”).
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Accordingly, the very nature of IIED encourages lawsuits when plaintiffs
profoundly disagree with or are insulted by defendants’ speech. The Court has
never allowed punishment of speech for such reasons.93
The other elements of IIED do nothing to limit potential censorship.
Although the intent requirement superficially limits liability to the worst actors,
it does little to protect free speech values. As noted above, an offender’s
perceived blameworthiness is a component of an outraged plaintiff’s
response—the defendant’s perceived blameworthiness is partly why the
plaintiff is angry. Anger also often causes plaintiffs to attribute bad intent to
those they want to find blameworthy, whether or not they actually acted with
such intent.94 Accordingly, IIED’s intent standard overlaps substantially with
and reinforces the outrage element, making use of the tort especially
problematic to punish speech that violates widely held social norms. That
speech is the very type of expression most likely to anger plaintiffs and cause
them to attribute blame.95 Similarly, the requirement of severe emotional
distress does not prevent punishment of speech based merely on the content of
its message. Even speech that contributes to public discourse can result in such
distress.96
Similar censorship problems arise with Snyder’s invasion of privacy
argument. Conflating intrusion and offensiveness reduces the question of tort
liability to whether speech is offensive to a reasonable person. As with IIED, a
plaintiff is most likely offended by speech that interferes with his or her values
and beliefs. Although invasion of privacy also requires an intrusion upon
seclusion, that concept is malleable97 and alone cannot prevent punishment
based solely on a plaintiff’s offense at the speaker’s message if the intrusion
element is equated with offensive conduct. In fact, the district court’s
instructions to the jury in Snyder effectively ignored the seclusion element and

93. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (holding that the state cannot regulate flag
burning to promote respect for the flag); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (finding
unconstitutional a law prohibiting the display of signs tending to bring foreign governments into
public odium or disrepute); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–24 (1971) (holding that the state
cannot censor citizens to promote public civility).
94. CLORE, ORTNEY & COLLINS, supra note 84, at 151; Miller, supra note 86, at 537.
95. It is perhaps not surprising that Falwell rejected the intent standard of IIED as
insufficiently protective of speech. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (quoting
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
96. Although emotional distress can manifest in physical symptoms (occasionally required
to recover in some jurisdictions), such symptoms are not objective indicia of harm like the threats,
violence or other indicia present in the Court’s low value speech categories or captive audience
doctrine. Physical symptoms, although more tangible than emotional harm, still emanate from the
listener’s response to the offensive message. Such a response is not consistent with the Court’s
conception of low value speech as speech that, by definition, does not contribute to public
discourse.
97. Wells, supra note 5, at 181–82 (“recognizing relative zones of privacy involves a
delicate balance of preserving social interaction while carving out necessary spaces of refuge in
public”); MCCARTHY, supra note 72, § 5:98 (noting that zones of seclusion are a product of
“custom and usage” rather than of objective factors).
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focused almost entirely on the potential outrageousness and offensiveness of
the Phelpses’ expression, despite the common law elements of the tort.98 It is
unsurprising, then, that the jury returned a verdict in Snyder’s favor.
Ultimately, tort liability based solely upon speech that offends or outrages
others would chill speech because of its arbitrary and unpredictable nature.
Responses to speech are particularized and personal. Anyone may respond with
anger, and a lawsuit, to speech they consider demeaning and personally
offensive. To be sure, most offensive speech will not satisfy the elements of
IIED or invasion of privacy. But any contentious speech perceived to be
personally directed—such as criticism of one’s religion, criticism of military
efforts, or burning the flag—could be the basis for a tort suit. The capricious
nature of such lawsuits would cast a pall over public debate.99
The existence of a jury, which should filter truly frivolous claims of
offense or outrage, also cannot prevent this chilling effect. Juries cannot
prevent the potential filing of such lawsuits, which alone chills public
discourse.100 Additionally, although juries might filter the most specious
claims, they may facilitate censorship in other ways. In fact, the more society
perceives speech to violate or disrespect widely held social norms, the more
likely a jury will sympathize with the plaintiff. As one noted psychologist
found:
The arousal of moralistic anger is not confined to injustices
perpetrated against one’s self. Witnessing the harming of a third
party can also arouse strong feelings of anger and injustice. . . .
Individuals are committed to the “ought forces” of their moral
community . . . and people believe these forces deserve respect from
all members of the community. The violation of these forces
represents an insult to the integrity of the community and provokes
both moralistic anger and the urge to punish the offender in its
members.101
A jury will most likely experience “moralistic anger” when a speaker
violates otherwise widely held social norms, such as protesting near another’s
funeral. While the emotional response of jurors may be an issue in any trial, it
is uniquely concerning in First Amendment cases. Juries in civil tort suits are

98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
99. Like a vague statute, the lack of notice associated with lawsuits based on offensive
speech subjects potential defendants to arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement. Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 573–74 (1974) (finding that a flag contempt statute “fails to draw reasonably clear
lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that are not”); see
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort,
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 302 (2010) (“[T]he vagueness of the ‘outrageousness’
standard exacerbates the risk that the emotional distress tort will deter . . . speech.”).
100. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (discussing how the threat of
litigation may create a “pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to
public criticism” and “an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive”).
101. Miller, supra note 86, at 535.
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likely to punish unpopular speakers precisely because they are unpopular. Such
a result runs counter to First Amendment tenets because it silences particular
viewpoints102 and “lead[s] to standardization of ideas . . . by courts [and]
dominant political or community groups.”103
CONCLUSION
If the Phelpses were noisy or disruptive, officials could justifiably regulate
their protests. Civil liability for IIED and invasion of privacy might also be
appropriate if the Phelpses’ expression contained threats, intentional lies, or
other external indicia of harm.104 But the speech here did not involve those
circumstances. It involved offensive messages. For good reason, the Court’s
doctrine has never allowed regulation of speech solely on that basis. Because of
the nature of emotional reactions to offensive speech, allowing plaintiffs to rely
on offense alone turns civil lawsuits into potential tools of suppression. While
the law has never shown much solicitude for the intentional infliction of
emotional harm or invasion of privacy,105 the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence surely does not countenance the primacy of these torts.

102. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
does not permit a State to . . . [punish] the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”).
103. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949); see also Robert Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 632 (1990).
104. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of First Amendment Law in Support of
Respondent Phelps at 26–32, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. July 14, 2010) (discussing
appropriate standards for imposing IIED and invasion of privacy liability on speech); Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26–27, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751, (U.S. July 14, 2010)
(embracing Fourth Circuit’s “provably false” statement of fact standard).
105. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).

